A new geopolitical architecture in the Middle East 

We may not be certain about many things, but the events of the past year and a half in the Middle East clearly demonstrate that a new geopolitical and security architecture is emerging.

Since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the region has been caught in a persistent cycle of violence—from Gaza to Lebanon, Yemen, and even Iran. The attack marked a turning point, showcasing the ambitions of the so-called Axis of Resistance (AoR), which had long championed the idea of a unified, all-out offensive against Israel in pursuit of liberating Palestine and capturing Jerusalem.

More than 20 months later, however, the AoR appears fragmented, weakened, and increasingly irrelevant in the current conflict. With its decline, we are witnessing the contours of a new regional order, one in which Israel is emerging as the central power shaping the future geopolitical landscape.

The emerging geopolitical architecture in the Middle East is increasingly being shaped by three key pillars: Israel, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia. While Iran remains a significant actor, its regional influence is waning as its proxies are degraded and its regime faces mounting internal and external pressures.

Turkiye: The collapse of the Assad regime has opened the door for Türkiye to reassert itself as a major geopolitical force in the region. Although elements of the current Syrian government still receive support from Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ankara’s growing influence is driven by its assertive foreign policy and rapidly expanding arms industry, particularly its advanced drone capabilities. Türkiye’s strategic positioning and security posture will likely cement its role as a central player in the region’s evolving power dynamics.

Israel: The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack fundamentally altered Israel’s security doctrine. Over the past 20 months, Israel has demonstrated its position as the region’s dominant military power. Through its intelligence agency, Mossad, and the decisive use of airpower, Israel has neutralized many of the AoR’s traditional tactics and capabilities, creating a new operational reality in which the AoR’s asymmetric warfare is no longer effective.

Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical clout is growing through a combination of economic transformation, the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), and its strategic alliance with the United States, the world’s most powerful military force. The kingdom’s role is pivotal to the expansion of the Abraham Accords, given its symbolic and political weight in the Islamic world. Riyadh’s regional vision, underpinned by economic diversification and cautious diplomacy, positions it as an indispensable actor in shaping the Middle East’s future.

Iran: Throughout the conflict, Iran and its proxies have failed to maintain a united front against Israel. The Islamic Republic only engaged militarily when directly targeted, offering little meaningful support to its allied groups, neither to the Houthis in Yemen nor to Hezbollah in Lebanon, even after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut’s southern suburbs. The Iranian “octopus” of regional influence has been systematically dismantled by a sustained, Israel-led campaign, aided by U.S. strikes on key nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz. The regime has been significantly weakened. To regain regional relevance, Iran will require substantial geopolitical maneuvering, including the lifting of sanctions, internal reconstruction, and the survival of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

With that in mind, the quicker this new geopolitical architecture solidifies, the sooner war-torn countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen may begin to breathe again after years of protracted conflict. This is particularly significant in Lebanon, where the decline of Hezbollah’s influence could pave the way for dismantling entrenched corruption, attracting investment for reconstruction, and repositioning the country as the Arab world’s gateway to a Western cultural experience.